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From a phenomenological perspective, one
has to be able to offer a description of the pre-re-
flective, primal internal state, i.e., to set it in a dis-
course as a theme of inquiry through the reflec-
tive gesture of the method. Here emerges what
Gallagher and Zahavi properly call the “gain”
and the “loss” of the phenomenological method,
which, as reflective, “does not merely copy or re-
peat the original experience; rather, it transforms
it.”1 Entrance into the methodological reflection
marks the passage from the self-consciousness
(pre/non-reflective self-awareness) to the proper
consciousness (reflective awareness) and puts in
play the egological-subjective feature of the in-
ner life. The coming out of the Ego becomes a
help to the description (I as I can now not only
feel but also know, i.e., consciously recognize
my self-consciousness experiences as mine),
while at the same time it provides an additional
complication of the question: Is there no Ego in
the pre-reflective sphere? Who then feels self-
consciousness as her own?
The question of the reference of the reflecting
act to its pre-reflective root is of basic importance
from a phenomenological standpoint, because it
deals not only with the essence of the method, but
also with the status of Ego as performer of such a
method. If one identifies the egological level only
with the reflective one, it becomes hard to affirm
that the pre-reflective sphere is self-aware: how is
it possible to talk about a self, which in turn is not
an I? But on the other hand, if one attributes the
egological trait both to the reflective and to the
pre-reflective consciousness grade, it is possible
to question not only the legitimacy, but also the
necessity of something like the phenomeno-
logical method: why should I carry on a reflec-
tion on myself, if I am self-aware already as pre-
reflecting?
To exit from this antinomy, one has to come
back to the fundamental distinction Gallagher
and Zahavi make between feeling and knowing,
where only the latter is linked to the authentically
egological level of self-awareness (the one of the
method), while the former describes the immedi-
ate experience of self: “When I am aware of a cur-
rent pain, perception, or thought, the experience
in question is given immediately, non-inferen-
tially, and non-criterially as mine”; it means that
“I am usually able to respond immediately, i.e.,
without inference or observation, if somebody
asks me what I have been doing, or thinking, or
seeing, or feeling immediately prior to the ques-
tion.”2 The central mark of pre-reflective self-
awareness is thus its present occurring, which in-
volves simultaneity of experiencing (perceiving,
being in pain, thinking) and being aware of it.
If I cannot doubt a self as mine when I am cur-
rently experiencing something I am living now,
because I feel prior to knowing that I am experi-
encing, what happens to past experiences? If to
the question “are you in pain?” i.e., “are you as
your-self in pain?” I am able to answer immedi-
ately “Yes I am—as my-self,” since I am simulta-
neously feeling in pain, can I show the same con-
fidence to the question, “Are you—as your-
self—the one who was in pain?” In this case I am
not feeling in pain, but I should remember having
been in pain, and so I should know that I as my-
self am the same one who was before in pain and
remembers it now, and that the pain was and is al-
ways mine. From where does this knowledge de-
rive? What is its legitimacy, considering that it
lacks the grounding trait of immediacy? This
question is linked to the former one about time,
which has elapsed between the experienced pain
and the remembered one, and so such a question
must find a solution related to its temporal mark.
Edmund Husserl dealt with a similar issue in
his Time-Lectures regarding what he calls the
“most important matters of phenomenology,”
which he treats in §39 of the text, where he works
out the fundamental notion of the double
intentionality of retention and the connected
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question of the constitution of stream of con-
sciousness.3 “The duality in the intentionality of
retention gives us a clue to the solution of the dif-
ficulty concerning how it is possible to be aware
of a unity belonging to the ultimate constituting
flow of consciousness.”4 The difficulty is due to
the involvement of temporal determinations like
“now,” “before,” and “after” also for the descrip-
tion of the time-constituting flow. There is the
risk of an infinite regress, because the determina-
tion of these temporal features needs a new time-
consciousness, which in turn needs a new time-
consciousness and so on (see Husserl 1991, 80).
The solution to these difficulties begins with
the conceptual—rather then merely terminologi-
cal—distinction between Erinnerung and Reten-
tion: if at first sight it seems to be shocking, if not
absurd, that the same consciousness-flow consti-
tutes the temporal unity of a tone and at the same
time (Zugleich) the unity of itself, this shock or
absurdity can be overcome if one understands the
time-consciousness has two kinds of intentional
regards (Blicke) to pay attention to its own
internality: “Our regard can be directed, in the
one case, through the phases that ‘coincide’in the
continuous progression of the flow and that func-
tion as intentionalities of the tone. But our regard
can also be aimed at the flow, at a section of the
flow, at the passage of the flowing consciousness
from the beginning of the tone to its end.”5 To this
duplicity of the regard corresponds the double
intentionality of retention: “one serves for the
constitution of the immanent object, of the tone;
it is this intentionality that we call ‘primary mem-
ory’ of the (just sensed) tone, or more precisely,
just retention of the tone. The other intentionality
is constitutive of the unity of this primary mem-
ory in the flow.”6 If each memory is as such also a
retention, not every retention is a memory, i.e., an
intentional ray apt to the constitution of a tempo-
ral objectivity, but it is also always a retention of
this memory itself and thus of the original sensa-
tion, of which the primary memory is a memory:
“the retention of a retention has intentionality not
only in relation to what is immediately retained
but also in relation to what, in the retaining, is re-
tained of the second degree, and ultimately in re-
lation to the primal datum, which is objectivated
throughout the process.”7 Precisely since it is
able to grasp two conscious acts in their inten-
tional interrelation, the retention guarantees the
coincidence of the flow with itself, i.e., its unity:
“Thus there extends throughout the flow a hori-
zontal intentionality (Längsintentionalität) that,
in the course of the flow, continuously coincides
with itself,”8 and from which the unity of
consciousness-flow itself derives.
The horizontal/longitudinal intentionality9 is
what Husserl calls also “retention of retention,”
that is, retention of primary memory, because it
goes through along the length of consciousness’s
flowing, and in this way it makes an operation of
coinciding homogenization; on the other hand,
the simple memory (Erinnerung) is called also
“transversal intentionality” (Querintentionali-
tät), in which “I direct my interest towards the
tone,” which, as a lasting tone, extends along its
duration. “If I focus [instead] on the “horizontal
intentionality” and on what is becoming consti-
tuted in it, I turn my reflective regard away from
the tone (which has endured for such and such a
length of time) towards what is new in the way of
primal sensation at one point in the retentional
being-all-at-once and towards what is retained
‘all at once’ with this new primal sensation in a
continuous series.”10 Though it is structured in a
double mode, there is one retention, which is, ac-
cording to its intentional feature, sometimes Re-
tention als Erinnerung and sometimes Retention
der Retention. The unity of retention allows pre-
cisely the unity of the flow, a unity which has to
assume the peculiar form of the self-reference, in
order to exorcize the ghost of the infinite regress.
Since it is always one and the same retention,
which refers, on the one hand, to a constituted
temporal object and, on the other hand, to the
constituting consciousness’s mode, we can talk
about one and the same consciousness, which is
sometimes a consciousness as flow of constituted
objectivities and sometimes consciousness as a
flow which constitutes itself.11
This very complex consciousness process is
possible thanks to the fundamental figure of co-
incidence (Deckung) between the different fea-
tures of this consciousness. This coincidence is
in turn possible only within a structure like the in-
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tentional one, which has its way of being in de-
presentation (Ent-Gegenwärtigung), that is, in an
un-timing—constant because inborn—and so in
the relation of every own moment with itself, i.e.,
with its own having just elapsed. This having-
elapsed is not necessarily destined to oblivion,
but, on the contrary, is subject to a recovery, to a
memory, to a retentional and always also self-
retentional memory. As Husserl explains in a
passage of the Bernau Manuscripts, this self-
awareness of such consciousness is possible “be-
cause the flowing is not in general only a flowing,
but in the flowing there is also a consciousness of
the flowing, a consciousness of the transforma-
tion from a phase of the flow to the phases of the
flow, which are only points of the constant trans-
formation, just of the same flow which exists as
an aware-existing flow.”12
Though it represents a deeper analysis of the
peculiar moment of constitution of self by the
self, this “self” which performs such a constitu-
tion is identified by Husserl with “conscious-
ness” as a temporal-intentional feature, but not
with the Ego, precisely because this constitution
occurs spontaneously, i.e., passively and so with-
out an Ego’s act. Here the “self” of the constitu-
tion doesn’t mean the conscious life of subjectiv-
ity, rather its conscious’s life, namely, the natural
formation of consciousness by itself through the
temporal lasting of experience. It is a pre-reflec-
tive self-awareness, which as Zahavi properly re-
marks “is nothing but the perpetual self-manifes-
tation of the flow,”13 but which as such is not
enough to describe an authentic and full
egological awareness, since again in Zahavi’s
words, “self-awareness is merely a necessary and
not sufficient condition for I-consciousness.”14
Thus Husserl’s account of self-constitution is a
very good explanation of the auto-constitution of
consciousness, but only under the condition of
not mixing that “auto-” up with the self as I-self,
because it indicates a not yet conscious, i.e., re-
flective or egological awareness of self. It is a
passive, non-attentive awareness, which needs to
become a not only aware but also awake con-
sciousness of itself (a “waches Ich” in Husserlian
terms).15 However, this constitution does not
seem to be able to bridge the temporal gap be-
tween past and present, meaning as fully aware to
bridge this gap, and so to answer the question
concerning self-identity as arising out of a con-
text of immediacy. It is a self-constitution which
should allow such an answer, but it is not suffi-
cient to perform it. If to remember myself as mine
(and as I) requires knowing more than feeling,
one cannot find this knowledge within the self-
constitution described here by Husserl.16
Memory, Language, and the Self
Gareth Evans in his sharp remarks on “Self-
Identification” stresses this link between mem-
ory and knowledge precisely as regards the
elapsed time of personal experiences.17 This link
is supported by Evans’s statement about the judg-
ment-basis of self-consciousness that assumes
the form of “the persistence of a belief,” accord-
ing to which “if a subject has at t a belief which he
might then manifest in judging ‘I am now F,’ then
there is a non-negligible probability of his hav-
ing, at a later time t, a disposition to judge ‘I was
previously F.’”18 Nonetheless, Evans clarifies
that memory is a way to retain albeit not to gain
knowledge, and, for this reason, this proposi-
tional remembering has to be grounded not only
upon a judgment in the past-tense but also and
first of all upon a past perceptual experience. But
this is to deal with the case in which memory de-
velops following an earlier informational state of
the subject, the perceptual one that allows the I to
refer to its past as a part of its present experience,
and to identify itself as the one and the same who
not only has judged but who has lived that
elapsed state. It is the “non-conceptual informa-
tional states involved in perception [that] put a
subject in a position to acquire present-tense self-
knowledge by the exercise of his conceptual ca-
pacities, so these non-conceptual informational
states put a subject in a position to acquire past-
tense self-knowledge by the exercise of his con-
ceptual capacities.”19 What it is very interesting
in Evans’s reflections is the rooting of self-iden-
tity in the continuity of personal experience,
which the author expresses by jointing perceiv-
ing state and remembering state inside the same
subject as a grounding trait precisely of this con-
tinuity (and not as its result): “If a subject has, in
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virtue of the operations of his memory, knowl-
edge of the past states of a subject, then that sub-
ject is himself,” which allows saying that “it is of
the essence of an ‘I’-Idea that it effects an identi-
fication which spans past and present.”20
To put these assertions in phenomenological
terms, one can say that the passive self-constitu-
tion of consciousness (of perceptual and
retentional states) allows the development of an
egological awareness of it (remembering and
judging memory). A question, in any case, still
remains open: where, i.e., in which point of self-
consciousness, is there something like becoming
Ego? Prior to finding a phenomenological an-
swer to it, let me follow briefly a very pertinent
neuroscientific approach, relying upon the fruit-
ful interconnection between both accounts.
In their compelling study on consciousness,
Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi offer a very
detailed and analytical account of mental life, in
which they underline its being as process rather
than as thing, what they call a “dynamic core,”
which is “both continuous and continually
changing.”21 Along the path of this ceaseless
course a subjective existence develops, that is
identifiable through its multiple expressions,
which take place at every moment of the con-
sciousness continuum: “Given the number and
kinds of processes that are going on in parallel in
any individual at a particular moment—percep-
tions, images, feelings, beliefs, desires, moods,
emotions, plans, recollections—it is easy to be-
come confused.”22 The only way to exit from this
confusion is to distinguish a “primary conscious-
ness” and a “higher-order consciousness,” where
the former corresponds to the non-linguistic life
(mental life I), and the latter to the linguistic life
(mental life II); despite their clear, essential, and
irreducible difference, both forms of conscious-
ness “coexist, overlap, and feed each other.”23
The modality of these interactions between the
two spheres of mental life is decidedly temporal
and it determines as such the emergence of a self
as subjectivity:
Ascending value systems—the locus coeruleus,
basal forebrain nuclei, raphé nucleus, and hypo-
thalamus—send out a particular combination of
neurotransmitters that reflect the salience of these
various signals. The core must register the neural
consequences of this activity—feelings as well as
perceptions and recollections. At this point, a clear
elicitation of language and of the true subjective
(and emotional) life may emerge: an inner para-
phrase . . . and with this paraphrase, the entire
memory system of language is engaged. . . . With
the emergence of a higher-order consciousness
through language, there is a consciously explicit
coupling of feelings and values, yielding emotions
with cognitive components that are experienced by
a person—a self.24
This neurobiological description suggests a clear
image of a consciousness where the pre-reflec-
tive level, i.e., the pre-egological one, contrib-
utes fundamentally to the formation of the au-
thentically subjective one, the level of the
awakened awareness of a person; but, on the
other hand, this formation is not unidirectional,
since the higher level of consciousness comes
continuously back to the primal one in order to
raise and enrich it with the linguistic side of the
same lived experience, in what Edelman and
Tononi properly describe as the “mixture of
mental life I and mental life II.”25 Rather than
representing an obstacle to self-identity, the tem-
poral feature of mental life allows the self-recog-
nizing of the subject: only because of the last of
experience am I able to feel and to know this ex-
perience as mine, since I have time to recollect
my past life and to join it with the present one,
thanks to a process which I undergo (mental life
I), but which I can also consciously master (men-
tal life II). This passage from the pre-reflective
life to the reflective shows precisely the emer-
gence of self-consciousness not only as Ego, but
properly as becoming Ego, as Ego in fieri.
Phenomenological Sight
With regard to this egological trait of inquiry,
Eduard Marbach develops a very helpful point of
view, which is able to incorporate the findings of
neuroscience within a phenomenological per-
spective.26
When I speak of “egological trait” of inquiry I
mean the central role played by the subjective
feature of research both as method (first-person
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perspective) and as matter (the conscious side of
experience). With regard to the former, Marbach
claims that a veridical description of mental life
cannot renounce studying consciousness with re-
gard to its own nature, which involves emphasiz-
ing its subjective core, since “to be interested in
consciousness phenomenologically, i.e., study-
ing it in its own essence (Eigenwesentlichkeit) or
in its purity (Reinheit), is to be interested in
something subjectively available only.”27 It is
precisely this subjective access to a subjective ex-
perience that is worth stressing, because of its rel-
evance for a legitimacy of the first-person ac-
count: for an inquiry into consciousness, one
needs to analyze the consciousness of the in-
quirer, which means that to understand experi-
ence, one has to understand the experiencer, and
it is possible to gain such an understanding from
an inner point of view only.28 As Husserl taught,
and Marbach accurately reaffirms, the subjective
standpoint is a view by the subject on the subject,
the mental life of which has to be studied in its
multiply intentional structuring.
The so called “phenomenological notation”
allows grasping the different moments of the
subject’s life both in their own aspect and in their
continuous and essential interaction, focusing al-
ways attention on the intentional feature that
characterizes the case under study. To recognize
the intentional essence of every aspect of mental
life means being able to see its compound refer-
ence, which is oriented (1) to an object, (2) to
other acts of consciousness that contribute to the
experience of this object in various ways (such as
remembering, imaging, expecting and so on, i.e.,
the re-presenting mental processes), and (3) to
the environment that constitutes the surround-
ings of the lived and analyzed experience. In this
way Marbach clearly shows that to consider the
steady flow of consciousness as perceiving, to
talk about perception, does not exclude treating
the other spheres of experiencing, but rather nec-
essarily requires speaking of them.29
It is salient to note that as he deals with the
consciousness side of experience alone, i.e., with
the egoless side of it, Marbach does not speak of
the I as the performer of perceiving (or others’
mental activities), just as Husserl did not talk of
the subject when he dealt with the self-constitu-
tion of consciousness. This is because here what
is in question is what Edelman and Tononi call
mental life I, i.e., the purely pre-reflective (self-
awareness instead of I-awareness) level of expe-
riencing. But when Marbach has to treat the third
level of mental life, the one involving the envi-
ronment (Umgebung or Umwelt in Husserlian
terms) which surrounds conscious acting, the de-
scription develops in such a way that it becomes
necessary to highlight the purely egological level
of the studied experience. The reason is that, in a
phenomenological perspective, dealing with the
surroundings (the world of experience, the
Welterfahrung) means talking about the con-
sciousness structurally open to the world, as con-
sciousness of something, and the core of this con-
scious opening to the world lies in the subjective
center of experience, namely, the Ego as aware
performer of acts.30 Accordingly, Marbach clari-
fies that “what is called ‘I’ can, in a first approxi-
mation, be said to be a constituent part of one’s
surface awareness . . . when an activity mentally
representing something occurs.”31 Having ac-
knowledged the link that ties the I-level of experi-
ence to the bodily position of subject,32 Marbach
can then establish the equivocal position of the
Ego due to its becoming status, since this Ego is
both the actor of the first-person inquiry (the re-
flective level) and, more originally, the center, al-
though unaware, of consciousness’s perfor-
mances (the pre-reflective, primal level): “in its
very surface awareness, i.e., independently of, or
prior to, being reflected upon, an activity of men-
tally representing x involves the operative I-sub-
ject.”33 In this way, from an authentically
phenomenological standpoint, Marbach suc-
ceeds in unifying both levels of experiencing by
means of the notion of Ego as being in fieri, i.e.,
thought not “in isolation from mental activi-
ties,”34 but rather as a center of mental operations
which shares with all of them the temporal-inten-
tional flow of experiencing:35 “The overlapping
activities can be said ultimately to be rooted in
the fact that there is no part at all within the unity
of performing one’s mental representation that
would not at any given moment be related to the
operative I.”36 This centrality of the Ego within
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the development of consciousness as experienc-
ing life justifies the validity of a phenomeno-
logical account also with respect to the recent
findings of the neurosciences, since “on the basis
of the best of our current scientific knowledge I
also keep believing that ‘something’has been se-
lected in virtue of the development of the nervous
system that can originally be experienced as what
it is and what it is like solely from the experiential
perspective of experiencing creatures them-
selves—namely, conscious experience.”38
The inquiries elaborated by Eduard Marbach,
as well as ones recently developed by other
phenomenologists, such as Francisco Varela,
Dan Zahavi, and Dieter Lohmar, who are search-
ing for a fruitful connection among neurosci-
ence, cognitive fields of study, and the philosoph-
ical outlook, show one of the fruitful ways in
which phenomenology can unfold its basic is-
sues by taking into consideration new scientific
findings.39
To tell the story of the Ego from a philosophi-
cal standpoint does not mean ignoring or exclud-
ing the scientific perspective; rather it involves
understanding such a perspective and attempting
to frame it within a rigorous conceptual scheme.
Phenomenology, philosophy as “rigorous sci-
ence,” is naturally called upon to carry out this
complex but at the same time very fascinating
task.
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